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Ugovori o ekskluzivnoj trgovini kao oblik zloupotrebe dominantnog položaja u pravu konkurencije Evropske unije
Exclusive dealing contracts as a form of abuse of dominant position in EU competition law
dc.creator | Domazet, Siniša | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-04-07T14:03:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-04-07T14:03:28Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0017-0933 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://redun.educons.edu.rs/handle/123456789/223 | |
dc.description.abstract | Zloupotreba dominantnog položaja zabranjena je čl. 102. Ugovora o funkcionisanju EU. Jedan od oblika zloupotrebe dominantnog položaja predstavljaju ugovori o ekskluzivnoj trgovini. Praksa je pokazala da preduzeće koje je u dominantnom položaju na tržištu i veže kupce, uz pomoć obaveze ili obećanja sa njihove strane, da će pribavljati sve ili najveći deo svojih potrepština isključivo od datog preduzeća, vrši zloupotrebu dominantnog položaja. Ipak, ovi ugovori nisu nedopušteni per se. Argument protiv automatske zabrane ugovora o ekskluzivnom poslovanju leži u činjenici da ovi ugovori mogu biti objektivno opravdani s obzirom na njihove efekte na tržištu u svakom pojedinačnom slučaju. Objektivno opravdanje bi moglo biti moguće u situacijama u kojima bi antikonkurentski efekti datog ugovora o ekskluzivnom snabdevanju bili svedeni na minimum nužan za postizanje određenih ekonomskih prednosti, kao što su sigurnost snabdevanja, niže cene i druge pogodnosti. Iskustva Evropske komisije biće od velike kori- sti za Komisiju za zaštitu konkurencije Republike Srbije, s obzirom na nedostatak odgovarajuće prakse u ovoj oblasti. | sr |
dc.description.abstract | Abuse of a dominant position is prohibited by Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. One form of abuse of dominant position is the exclusive dealing contracts. Practice has shown that an undertaking which is in a dominant position on the market, and ties purchasers by an obligation or promise on their part to obtain all or most of its supplies exclusively from the said company, abuses its dominant position. However, these contracts are not inadmissible per se. The argument against the automatic ban on exclusive contracts business lies in the fact that these contracts can be objectively justified in view of their effects on the market in each case. Objective justification might be possible in situations where the anti-competitive effects of the exclusive dealing contracts were reduced to the minimum necessary to achieve certain economic advantages, such as security of supply, lower prices, and other advantages. Experience of the European Commission will be of great benefit to the Commission for protection of competition of the Republic of Serbia, due to the lack of proper practice in this area. | en |
dc.publisher | Advokatska komora Vojvodine, Novi Sad | |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/Integrated and Interdisciplinary Research (IIR or III)/47009/RS// | |
dc.rights | openAccess | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Glasnik Advokatske komore Vojvodine | |
dc.subject | zloupotreba dominantnog položaja | sr |
dc.subject | ugovori o ekskluzivnoj trgovini | sr |
dc.subject | pravo | sr |
dc.subject | konkurencija | sr |
dc.subject | EU | sr |
dc.subject | law | en |
dc.subject | exclusive dealing contracts | en |
dc.subject | EU | en |
dc.subject | competition | en |
dc.subject | abuse of dominant position | en |
dc.title | Ugovori o ekskluzivnoj trgovini kao oblik zloupotrebe dominantnog položaja u pravu konkurencije Evropske unije | sr |
dc.title | Exclusive dealing contracts as a form of abuse of dominant position in EU competition law | en |
dc.type | article | |
dc.rights.license | BY-SA | |
dc.citation.epage | 382 | |
dc.citation.issue | 6 | |
dc.citation.other | 86(6): 370-382 | |
dc.citation.rank | M53 | |
dc.citation.spage | 370 | |
dc.citation.volume | 86 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.5937/gakv1406370D | |
dc.identifier.fulltext | http://redun.educons.edu.rs/bitstream/id/48/220.pdf | |
dc.identifier.rcub | conv_11 | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion |